Yiding Feng 冯逸丁

Postdoctoral Principal Researcher, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

yidingfeng@uchicago.edu              CV                      Google Scholar Profile

Hi! I am a postdoctoral principal researcher at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, working with Rad Niazadeh and Vahideh Manshadi. I worked as a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research New England from 2021 to 2023. I received my Ph.D. [thesis] from the Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University in 2021 where my advisor was Jason D. Hartline. Before that, I received my BS degree from ACM Honors Class at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. 

My current research focuses on examining commonly used algorithms/mechanisms and developing new ones in various online marketplaces. I have primarily addressed problems in online decision making, mechanism & information design.

I will be joining HKUST IEDA as an assistant professor in 2024!

Preprints & Papers under Review

Batching and Optimal Multi-stage Bipartite Allocations

Near-optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources

Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World

Mobility Data in Operations: The Facility Location Problem

Online Assortment of Reusable Resources with Exogenous Replenishment

Journal Articles

Two-stage Matching and Pricing with Applications to Ride Hailing

Controlling Epidemic Spread: Reducing Economic Losses with Targeted Closures

Conference Proceedings

Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response

Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Bayesian Persuasion

Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities

Competitive Information Design for Pandora's Box

Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret

Near-optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources

Bias-Variance Game

Revelation Gap for Pricing from Samples

Batching and Optimal Multi-stage Bipartite Allocations

Two-stage Matching and Pricing with Applications to Ride Hailing

Global Concavity and Optimization in a Class of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility

An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)