Yiding Feng 冯逸丁

Postdoctoral Researcher, Microsoft Research New England

yidingfeng@microsoft.com CV Google Scholar Profile

Hi! I am a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research New England. I previously received my PhD [thesis] from Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University in 2021 where my advisor was Jason D. Hartline. Before that, I received my BS degree from ACM Honors Class at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

My current research focuses on examining commonly used algorithms/mechanisms and developing new ones in various online marketplaces (e.g., advertising, ride hailing, cloud computing, vacation rental, video recommendation), taking into account potential concerns or features from uncertainties (due to the stochastic nature or real-time aspect of the application), incentives (due to the strategic behavior of users), competition (across platforms), or presence of highly detailed user data. As an interdisciplinary researcher, I approach these marketplaces with a fresh perspective as well as novel ideas from operations, economics, and computer science. Through collaboration with researchers in both academia and industry, I have primarily addressed problems in online decision making (e.g., online resource allocation, online learning), mechanism & information design, and optimization.

I am on the 2022-2023 academic job market (operations, computer science).

Preprints & Papers under Review

Batching and Optimal Multi-stage Bipartite Allocations

Near-optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources

Bias-Variance Games

  • with Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck Johnsen and Denis Nekipelov

  • revise and resubmit at Management Science (MS)

  • extended abstract appeared at EC'22

Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual

  • with Farbod Ekbatani and Rad Niazadeh

  • under preparation

Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response

  • with Chien-Ju Ho and Wei Tang

  • under review

Online Assortment of Reusable Resources with Exogenous Replenishment

Journal Articles

Two-stage Matching and Pricing with Applications to Ride Hailing

  • with Rad Niazadeh and Amin Saberi

  • forthcoming in Operations Research (OR)

Controlling Epidemic Spread: Reducing Economic Losses with Targeted Closures

  • with John R. Birge and Ozan Candogan

  • Management Science (MS)

Conference Proceedings

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities

  • with Jason D. Hartline and Yingkai Li

  • in Proc. 34th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2023)

Competitive Information Design for Pandora's Box

  • with Bolin Ding, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang and Haifeng Xu

  • in Proc. 34th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2023)

Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret

  • with Wei Tang and Haifeng Xu

  • in Proc. 23rd ACM conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2022)

Near-optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources

  • with Rad Niazadeh and Amin Saberi

  • in Proc. 23rd ACM conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2022)

Bias-Variance Game

  • with Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck Johnsen and Denis Nekipelov

  • in Proc. 23rd ACM conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2022)

Revelation Gap for Pricing from Samples

  • with Jason D. Hartline and Yingkai Li

  • in Proc. 53rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2021)

Batching and Optimal Multi-stage Bipartite Allocations

  • with Rad Niazadeh

  • in Proc. 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS 2021)

Two-stage Matching and Pricing with Applications to Ride Hailing

  • with Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi

  • in Proc. 32nd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2021)

Global Concavity and Optimization in a Class of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models

  • with Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya and Denis Nekipelov

  • in Proc. 37th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2020)

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility

  • with Jason D. Hartline and Yingkai Li

  • in Proc. 20th ACM conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2019)

An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)

  • with Jason D. Hartline

  • in Proc. 59th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2018)